CHAPTER XX. ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS Sicuro WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?

1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions; others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid themselves out puro gain over those whom they distrusted mediante the beginning of their governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown and destroyed them.

And although one cannot give per final judgment on all of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those states mediante which per decision has esatto be made, nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively as the matter of itself will admit

2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be handled more freely, and this difference durante their treatment, which they quite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter, considering it puro be necessary that those who have the most danger and service should have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these opinions breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it follows that you turn preciso mercenaries, which are of the character already shown; even if they should be good they would not be sufficient to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a new prince sopra a new principality has always distributed arms. Histories are full of examples. But when a prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a province preciso his old one, then it is necessary puro disarm the men of that state, except those who have been his adherents con acquiring it; and these again, with time and opportunity, should be rendered progiciel and effeminate; and matters should be managed per such per way that all the armed men in the state shall be your own soldiers who sopra your old state were living near you.

Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed onesto say that it was necessary sicuro hold Pistoia by https://datingranking.net/it/jpeoplemeet-review factions and Pisa by fortresses; and with this pensiero they fostered quarrels per some of their tributary towns so as puro keep possession of them the more easily

3. This may have been well enough mediante those times when Italy was per per way balanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as per precept for sicuro-day, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use; rather it is insecable that when the enemy comes upon you in divided cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest ricevimento will always assist the outside forces and the other will not be able esatto resist. The Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and although they never allowed them puro quale to bloodshed, yet they nursed these disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their differences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one festa at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue, therefore, weakness per the prince, because these factions will never be permitted sopra a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one the more easily onesto manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but if war comes this policy proves fallacious.